Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Richard Norris v. Utah Labor Commission, Harold
Van Adams and/or Unisured Employers Fund :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Alan L. Hennebold; Nancy L. Kemp; Mark Shurtleff; Edward Ogilvie; Harold Van Adams; Counsel
for Appellees.
Melvin A. Cook; Martin, Nelson, Cook and Taylor; Counsel for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Richard Norris v. Utah Labor Commission, Harold Van Adams and/or Unisured Employers Fund, No. 20090784 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1892

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20090784-CA
fN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD NORRIS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Respondents/Appellees.
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Labor Commission
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
NANCY L. KEMP (5498)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: 801-366-0533
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Uninsured Employers Fund

MELVIN A. COOK (7489)
Martin, Nelson, Cook & Taylor
139 East South Temple #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-538-0073
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

EDWARD O. OGILVIE (2452)
P. O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Telephone: 801-530-6937
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Utah Labor Commission
HAROLD VAN ADAMS
5293 East Elkhorn Circle
Eden, Utah 84310
Attorney Pro Se

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLEE
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 0 3 2010

Case No. 20090784-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD NORRIS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Respondents/Appellees.
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Labor Commission
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
NANCY L. KEMP (5498)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: 801-366-0533
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Uninsured Employers Fund

MELVIN A. COOK (7489)
Martin, Nelson, Cook & Taylor
139 East South Temple #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-538-0073
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

EDWARD O. OGILVIE (2452)
P. O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
Telephone: 801-530-6937
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Utah Labor Commission
HAROLD VAN ADAMS
5293 East Elkhorn Circle
Eden, Utah 84310
Attorney Pro Se

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

. . . . iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below

4

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER WAS AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR

8

II.

III.

8

A.

Part or Process in the Trade or Business

9

B.

Method of Payment

10

C.

Extent of Actual Supervision

14

D.

Right to Control the Work v. Autonomy

15

E.

Tools and Supplies

19

F.

Miscellaneous Factors

20

ANY WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ADAMS WAS SEVERED BEFORE PETITIONER
SUSTAINED HIS INJURY

21

LIB ERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKERS* COMPENSATION
ACT DOES NOT ENTITLE PETITIONER TO BENEFITS WHERE THE
RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION

26

i

Page
CONCLUSION

27

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Allen v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workforce Appeals Bd.,
2005 UT App 186, 112 P.3d 1238

3

Bennetv. Indus. Comm'n of Utah,
726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986)

9

Dipoma v. McPhie,
2001 UT 61, 29 P.3d 1225

20

Gates v. Labor Comm 'n,
2002 UT App 428, 2002 WL 31839167

2,7, 11,26

Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review,
116 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989)

7-8, 11, 25

Grand County v. Rogers,
2002 UT 25,44 P.3d 734

2

Herman v. Sherwood Indus., Inc.,
244 Conn. 502, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998)
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints,
2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384

24
8, 11

Nails v. Market Tire Co.,
29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)

24-25

Nicholson v. Indus. Comm'n,
76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d 547 (1953)

22-23

Osman Home Improvement v. Indus. Comm'n,
958 P.2d 240 (Utah App. 1998)

2

Rustler Lodge v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah,
562 P.2d 227 (Utah 1977)

9-10

St. Anthony Hosp. v. James,
889 P.2d 1279 (Okla. App. 1994)

23-24

in

Page
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'n,
2007 UT 4, 153 P.3d 179

3

Strate v. Labor Comm'n,
2006 UT App 179, 136 P.3d 1273

26

Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah,
860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993)

22

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103 (West 2004) (subsection (7)(a) amended 2008)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103 Supp. 2009)

9

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (West 2004)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (West 2009)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009)

1

Utah R. App. P. 30

2
PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS

To the best knowledge of respondent Uninsured Employers Fund, there are no
prior or related judicial appeals in this case.

IV

Case No. 20090784-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD NORRIS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, HAROLD VAN ADAMS and/or
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Respondents/Appellees.
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Labor Commission
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The petition for review of this workers' compensation claim is taken from the
Labor Commission's Order Amending ALJfs Decision and Affirming Denial of Benefits
issued on August 28, 2009. R. 185-89. The order concluded, contrary to the decision of
the administrative law judge (ALJ), that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an
employee, of respondent Adams, but affirmed the ALJ!s determination that petitioner is
not entitled to benefits because any working relationship between petitioner and Mr.
Adams had ended before the time of the accident. Petitioner filed a timely petition for
review of the Commission's order on September 25, 2009. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009) gives this Court jurisdiction over "the final orders and
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies."

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1. Did the Labor Commission reasonably conclude that petitioner was an
independent contractor, not respondent Adams' employee?
Standard of Review: "Because the Legislature has vested the Labor Commission
(the Commission) with a great deal of discretion concerning matters involving workers'
compensation, we will reverse the Commission's decisions only if they are unreasonable
or irrational." Gates v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 428 at *1, 2002 WL 31839167 .*
See also Osman Home Improvement v. Indus. Comm'n, 958 P.2d 240, 243 (Utah App.
1998) ("In applying [an intermediate] standard [of review], we determine whether the
agency decision exceeded '"the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'") (quoting
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted)). To the extent that petitioner challenges the
Commission's underlying factual findings, they "will be affirmed so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, 'in light of the whole record.' So long as the findings
are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn them 'even if another
conclusion from the evidence is permissible.'" Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at * 1 (quoting
Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998) (internal citation omitted;
quotations and citation omitted in original)).

Unpublished decisions of this Court are binding precedential authority. Grand
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 16, 44 P.3d 734; see also Utah R. App. P. 30(f).
2

2. Assuming, only for purposes of argument, that petitioner was an employee of
Mr. Adams, did his claimed injury occur in the course of his employment, for purposes of
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(l) (West 2004)?
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has held that whether an employee
is within the course of employment for purposes of the Workers1 Compensation Act "is a
mixed question of law and fact." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT 4,
% 13, 153 P.3d 179 (analyzing liability under the coming-and-goi^ig rule). "Agency
decisions that apply the law to facts are entitled to discretion and 'are [only] subject to
judicial review to assure that they fall within the limits of reasonableness and rationality.1"
Allen v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT App 186, % 6, 112
P.3d 1238 (quoting Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610
(Utah 1983) (alteration in original)). "In contrast, we will overturn an agency's factual
findings only if they are fnot supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court.1" Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)
(1997)).2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief.

2

The identical statutory language is now found at Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009).
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Petitioner filed his application for hearing in this case on February 6, 2006,

seeking workers1 compensation benefits for an injury allegedly sustained in an industrial
accident occurring on December 26, 2005. R. 1-2. The case was heard by an
administrative law judge, who denied benefits. The ALJ ruled that petitioner was an
employee of respondent Adams, but concluded that the employment relationship was
terminated on December 23, 2005, and that the accident causing the alleged injury took
place neither within the time and space boundaries of the employment nor in the course of
an activity related to the employment. R. 126-32.
Petitioner moved for review by the Utah Labor Commission. R. 133-46. The
Commission adopted the ALTs findings of fact, but, contrary to the ALJfs determination,
concluded that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an employee, and was not
entitled to workers' compensation benefits for this reason. The Commission agreed,
however, that even if petitioner had established that he was Mr. Adams' employee, he
would still not be entitled to benefits because any employment relationship had ended by
the time of the accident. R. 185-89; 187 n.2. Petitioner then sought review in this Court.

4

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts3
Respondent Adams owns certain rental properties in Midyale, Utah. R. 127. Mark

Warburton collects rent on the properties from the tenants for Mr. Adams. He is also the
person tenants contact if repairs are needed, and the person who contacts repairmen to
perform the repairs. R. 127 n.l. On November 22, 2005, Mr. Warburton offered to pay
petitioner $1,500 to "fix up" three vacant, vandalized apartments, an amount that included
both labor and supplies. R. 127, 185-86. The project required petitioner to remove
garbage; rake leaves; repair drywall, plumbing, and furnaces; and-perform sandblasting.
R. 127 n.l, 186. Petitioner stated that he could complete the project in three to four days.
R. 127. He used his own truck and tools, including his own air compressor. R. 128, 186.
Some cleaning supplies and a trailer to haul away trash were made available for his use.
R. 128, 186.
On November 27, 2005, Mr. Warburton visited the apartments and became upset
by the lack of progress on the project. At that time, petitioner presented him with receipts
for work and material that exceeded the agreed $1,500 budget, k. 186. Mr. Warburton
then left town for approximately one week. On his return, petitioner gave him a summary
ofwork time and receipts totaling approximately $4,500. R. 123, 186. On December 6,
2005, Mr. Warburton and Mr. Adams surveyed the project, which was still incomplete,

Respondent Uninsured Employers Fund (UEF) notes that petitionees statement of
facts is replete with references to his own testimony contradicting the facts as found by
the ALJ and the Commission. UEF submits that the relevant facts are those found by the
Commission, adopting the ALJfs findings-not petitioner's testimony to the contrary.
5

and met with petitioner. Mr. Adams gave petitioner a check for $4,000 and told petitioner
to wrap up the job. Petitioner responded that he would finish in one day. R. 128, 186.
Mr. Warburton developed pneumonia and was unable to visit the site for the next
ten days. On December 23, 2006, Mr. Adams visited the property, and petitioner asked
for an additional $9,800. Mr. Adams refused, pointed out petitioner's shoddy
workmanship, and ordered petitioner off the property. Petitioner threatened Mr. Adams
physically, collected his tools, and left. R. 128, 186.
Petitioner returned to the job site on December 26, 2005, with a third party to
retrieve his air compressor, and allegedly injured his back helping to lift the compressor
into his truck-an injury he first reported to his doctor over one month later. R. 129, 186.
In subsequent correspondence with Mr. Warburton, he threatened to file a civil lawsuit
and to make a report to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. R. 124, 128.
On January 12, 2006, he filed a mechanic's lien against the property in the amount of
$8,907.32. R. 122, 128. On February 13, 2006, he wrote to Mr. Adams, informing him
of the injury and again threatening suit. R. 125, 128.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ALJ and the Commission, while agreeing on the facts underlying petitioner's
claim to employee status, disagreed on the result: the Commission, unlike the ALJ,
concluded that petitioner was an independent contractor, not an employee. Petitioner
points to the conflict between his and respondents1 testimony to support his claim of
employee status. However, in determining whether the Commission's decision is
6

supported by substantial evidence, this Court "will not substitute its judgment as between
two reasonably conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different
conclusion had the case come before us for de novo review." Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of
Review, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, petitioner has not scrupulously
marshaled the evidence supporting the facts that underlie the Commission's decision, as
he is required to do. Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at *1. Because there is substantial
evidence of record supporting the Commission's decision, it falls within the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality, and there is no basis to disturb it.
Even if the Court were to rule that he was an employee, petitioner has failed to
counter the substantial evidence that any working relationship ended days before his
claimed injury. While he argues that respondents1 testimony on this issue is self-serving,
he acknowledges that the parties had a "falling out" on December 23, 2005, the date that
marked the end of the relationship under both the ALJfs and the Commission's analysis.
He also fails to recognize that his own testimony-and his self-generated written summary
showing that he worked for several hours on December 26, 2005, the date of the alleged
accident-are equally self-serving. As with the first issue, the substantial evidence
standard requires affirmance of the Commission's decision between plausible alternative
views of the evidence.
Petitioner's contention that any doubt must be resolved in favor of compensation
cannot be sustained in light of the applicable standard of review. Because the

7

Commission's decision, as supported by substantial evidence of record, falls within the
limits of reasonableness and rationality, it warrants this Court's affirmance.
ARGUMENT
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER WAS AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR, NOT AN EMPLOYEE
"Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence ... though
"something less than the weight of the evidence.'"" Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68
(quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)
(quoting Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)); see also Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, U 35, 164 P.3d
384 (quoting Grace Drilling). "An administrative law decision meets the substantial
evidence test when 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate' the evidence supporting
the decision." Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at % 35 (quoting Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). So long as the Commission^ conclusion
that petitioner was an independent contractor is based on evidence a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support it, petitioner's disagreement with the result is not a
basis for reversal. And nothing in petitioner's argument forecloses the reasonable
conclusion drawn by the Commission: that he was not an employee of respondent
Adams. R. 187.
The Commission began its analysis by referring to Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-103(7)(a) (West 2004), noting that, under the statute, an employer who retains
8

supervision and control over the work performed by a contractor is considered the
contractor's employer if the "work is a part or process in the trade or business of the
employer."4 It then examined a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to control, as
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726
P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1986), including the extent of actual supervision of the worker, the
method of payment, the furnishing of equipment, and the right to terminate the worker.
Applying these factors, the Commission concluded that petitioner "acted as an
independent contractor and was not an employee of Mr. Van Adams." R. 187. It
observed specifically that "the work Mr. Norris performed was not fpart or process in the
trade or business1" of Mr. Adams1 rental enterprise-a conclusion petitioner has not
contested. R. 187.
A.

Part or Process in the Trade or Business
Although petitioner does not directly address the Commission's conclusion that his

work was not a part or process in Mr. Adams1 rental business, the issue was addressed in a
case he cites. In Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 562 P.2d 227 (Utah
1977), a drywall applicator was held to be an employee of a lodge where he installed
drywall for a storage area and a conference room ceiling. There are significant
distinctions between the facts of Rustler Lodge and those of the present case. Relevant to
the issue of whether the work was a part or process in the trade or business, the Rustler

4

The same language is contained in the current codification of the statute at Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(7)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009).
9

Lodge court found "that the lodge regularly employed maintenance and handy men and
[the drywall applicator] in fact acknowledged that they were engaged in the performance
of light construction activity about the lodge at the same time in question," Rustler
Lodge, 562 P.2d at 229. Given the fact that the lodge "conducts its own maintenance and
repairs with a handyman crew hired for that purpose," id. at 228, the court had no
difficulty concluding "that the services performed by [the drywall applicator] were in the
same nature of maintenance and repairs being carried on by other employees of the lodge
and hence a part or process of the trade or business of the lodge." -Id. at 229.
By contrast, petitioner names no other employees of respondent Adams1 rental
business, let alone employees who were regularly engaged in the business of restoring
vandalized rental units. In fact, Mr. Warburton testified that maintenance issues were
routinely handled by outside contractors: "[W]eVe hired Carpet One for the carpet, we
hire the plumber for the plumbing. These guys come and in in [sic] there - they just do
the work. We got a leaky toilet. Okay, let me come and fix it. This carpet needs
replaced. Carpet One comes and replaces it." R. 191 at 143:8-13. Petitioner has
identified no evidence showing that respondent Adams had any employees at all, let alone
employees who performed the same work that he did.
B.

Method of Payment
Rustler Lodge is distinguishable on another basis. In that case, it was agreed that

the drywall applicator "would be paid at the hourly rate of $8." 562 P.2d at 228.
Although petitioner claims he was to be paid $40 per hour, neither the ALJ nor the
10

Commission credited his testimony on this point. R. 127 ("Mr. Warburton informed
Petitioner that the budget for fixing up the apartments was $1,500.00 which included
Petitioner's wage and services and supplies.") (footnote omitted); 186 n.l ("The
Commission notes Mr. Norris testified that he was offered $40 an hour to complete the
project. However, after reviewing the evidentiary record, the Commission finds the other
testimony more credible.").5
It is telling that petitioner admits in his brief that "the projected budget for the
Holden Street repairs was $1500.00." Aplt. Brief at 18.6 In addition, both Mr. Warburton
and respondent Adams testified that the budget for the entire project was $1,500. R. 191
at 108:24- 109:11, 109:16-21, 135:17-23, 141:1-7, 142:17, 165:1-3, 166:1-2, 183:8-12.
Mr. Warburton also explicitly denied-twice-that he ever agreed to pay petitioner by the
hour. R. 191 at 119:10-18, 140:7-8. He explained how the agreement to the $1,500
budget came about:

Petitioner complains that "[t]he Commission however never specifies what that
'other testimony1 was, but presumably it was the alleged $1500.00 budget for the needed
repairs." Aplt. Brief at 18. Respondent Uninsured Employers1 Fund observes that it is
petitioner's burden to "marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68; see
also Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 17, Gates, 2002 UT App 428 at *1. The Court has
discretion to decline to review the Commission's factual finding based on petitioner's
failure to marshal. Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 19.
6

This admission is particularly revealing in light of petitioner's hearing testimony
that he was unaware of the $1,500 budget until he confronted respondent Adams several
weeks after receiving a check for $4,000 on December 6, 2005. R. 191 at 96:24 - 97:11.
11

A
I borrowed a dolly from Mr. Norris back in probably November time
frame of last year and he was asking for the dolly. And I used the dolly to
move a refrigerator. I went to the apartments and there was four apartments
that were vandalized. Rick Norris was calling about his dolly. I said come
over here and get it, and when you get over here I'll show you something.
These apartments got thrashed. That's how the whole thing started. He
came over and picked up his dolly and looked in the four units that were
vandalized and that's where the whole-the whole thing started where, you
know, "Mark, I can help you fix these if you want. I'm a handyman kind of
thing." And that's where I called Van and asked him what the budge[t] was
for this. I told Rick Norris in person that the budget was $ 1,500, to go
ahead and see if we could get these apartments fixed. And what that meant
was painted, patching the holes, sanding, maybe those kinds of things to get
it back to rentable conditions.
Q
Did the $1,500 include Rick's salary as well or Rick's payment as
well?
A
$1,500 was the budget for the total project. Period.
R. 191 at 108:12 - 109:7. He further testified that petitioner agreed to those terms: "I
said we have a budget. If you can do it within his budget, do it. If he can't, don't do it.
That's basically how it started. 'Oh, I need some Christmas money. I'll do it for that.'
That's exactly how it was done." R. 191 at 112:22 - 113:1.
Another indication that respondent Adams did not agree to pay petitioner by the
hour is the projected completion time for the project. Although petitioner testified that
Mr. Warburton told him to turn in a time sheet every two weeks "[a]t the very beginning
when we first started[,]" R. 191 at 79:8, he had previously testified to telling Mr.
Warburton that the project could be completed in three or four days:
A
You know, there was a conversation when we first got started and
that. I remember him saying something to the effect, you know, how long
this is going to take and then I says, you know-I can't remember but it was
short time. It might have been four days or three days or something along
those lines.
12

R. 191 at 77:5-10. A projected completion date of three to four days is inconsistent with
petitioner's subsequent claim that, from the outset, he was to keep track of his hours and
turn in time sheets every two weeks-a period four times petitioner's own estimate of the
project's duration. It is, however, consistent with an agreement to pay a fixed sum for a
fixed result: restoration of the apartments to a rentable state. Petitioner's testimony that
he anticipated completing the project within a three-to-four-day period also casts doubt on
the credibility and accuracy of plaintiff s self-generated time sheet documents. See
R. 76-115. In fact, Mr. Warburton testified that he had never seen the alleged time sheets
contained in petitioner's Exhibit P-2, and that petitioner did not present the time sheet
summary contained in petitioner's Exhibit P-1 until he and Mr. Adams met with him on
December 6, 2005. R. 191 at 120:8 - 121:227
Although petitioner neglected his burden to marshal the evidence supporting the
Commission's finding that he was to be paid $1,500 to complete the project of
rehabilitating the rental units, there is substantial evidence of record that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support it. The Court need not reach petitioner's
argument on this point in light of his failure to marshal. But even if the Court chooses to
consider it, the substantial record evidence in support of the finding requires that it be
sustained.

7

Mr. Warburton's testimony clearly distinguishes between the daily time sheets
presented as Exhibit P-2 and the time sheet summary presented as Exhibit P-1. However,
Mr. Warburton became confused and erroneously referred to Exhibit P-1, the summary he
acknowledged having seen, as Exhibit P-2. See R. 191 at 121:20-22.
13

C.

Extent of Actual Supervision
As direct evidence of respondent's right to control the work, petitioner asserts that

the ALJ found "that Mr. Warburton was frequently on the job site." Aplt. Brief at 15. An
examination of both the ALJfs and the Commission's orders belies petitioner's statement.
The ALJ noted that after petitioner agreed to fix up the rental units on November 22,
2005, Mr. Warburton visited the rental units on the Sunday after Thanksgiving
(November 27, 2005) and then left town on December 1, returning with respondent
Adams to meet with petitioner again on December 6, 2005. Afterihat meeting, Mr.
Warburton developed pneumonia and did not visit the rental site for ten days. On his
recovery, he visited the property once a week. On December 23, Mr. Adams visited the
site and ordered petitioner off the property. R. 127-28. Simple calculation shows that
Mr. Warburtonfs visits between the time of petitionees engagement on November 22 and
his termination on December 23 numbered no more than three.8 The Commission's order
sets out a similar time line, showing Mr. Warburton visiting the property on November 27
and December 6, when he became bedridden for ten days, and thereafter visiting once a
week until December 23. As the Commission concluded, "This minimal interaction did
not amount to any form of supervision over Mr. Norris." R. 187. Petitioner's brief does

8

If Mr. Warburton visited on December 6, 2005, and was bedridden for the next
ten days, he would have been unable to visit until at least December 16. Given that
petitioner was ordered off the property on December 23, 2005, there could have been only
one "weekly" visit after Mr. Warburton's bout with pneumonia but before petitioner was
terminated from working on the project.
14

not take issue with the ALJ's or Commission's findings as to the dates of Mr. Warburton's
visits, but simply recharacterizes them as frequent. He provides no legal authority
supporting that recharacterization. See Aplt. Brief at 15-16.
D.

Right to Control the Work v. Autonomy
Contrary to petitioner's implication, the ALJ (and the Commission, by adopting the

ALJfs findings) did not conclude that petitioner's work was performed exclusively at
respondent's and Mr. Warburton's direction; rather, the ALJ stated that f,[o]n Mr.
Warburton's instruction or consent,, Petitioner boarded up windows, changed locks,
replaced thermostats, repaired drywall, a pothole, a gutter spout and a toilet handle,
boarded up windows, tore out carpeting, determined where leaks occurred and purchased
cheap cleaning supplies and paint." R. 128 (emphasis added). The fact that Mr.
Warburton consented to certain work proposed by petitioner emphasizes that petitioner
exercised a substantial degree of autonomy in selecting the activities he deemed
appropriate to the job of preparing the units for rental. As Mr. Warburton testified,
"Yeah, he had his own truck, had his own tools and, you know, it's like this is the project,
finish it. See you later, have a nice day. And then that was it." R. 191 at 142:6-8. He
further explained, "Well, I think what we talked about me and Rick were in together and
we talked about what needed to be done, and the objective was to get them [the
apartments] rentable. Period. Can you do it for this amount, yes or no? Yes, I can. That
was it." R. 191 at 146:2-5.

15

Mr. Warburton also stated that petitioner was "the one that kept adding little
things. fHey, Mark, this is this, and I found this, I found this, I found that, I found this/"
R. 191 at 146:9-11. He provided an example of petitioner's control over the way the
project proceeded:
Q
Did you ask Mr. Norris to repair a furnace in apartment number
four?
A
No, thatfs-what happened there was Rick tore out the hallway in that
area and he said I'm just removing the sheet rock and replacing the patch.
He took out the whole hallway, including the furnace at the end of the
hallway. I remember asking him why did you tear the furnace out? You
didn't need to tear the furnace out. "Well, yeah, I don't do-I do things the
right way and whatever." I says, you know, now after you patch this and
now that you're done with the job Fm going to have to hire a furnace guy to
come in and put it in here. "Oh, I can do it, I can do it, I can do it." It was
never done and we had to hire a furnace guy to come in there and the
furnace back in and charged us $250 to put the furnace back in.
R. 191 at 132:4-18. This testimony demonstrates that petitioner, not respondent, was in
charge of the way in which the job was performed.
Petitioner's claim that the ALJ found that "[h]e hired painters and other helpers at
Mr. Warburton's request" is equally unsupported. Aplt. Brief at 16. Scrutiny of the ALJ's
and the Commission's orders discloses no such finding in either document. Moreover,
this statement is in direct contradiction to Mr. Warburton's testimony at the hearing before
the ALJ. Mr. Warburton noted that when he was on the property about once a week,
"some of the times [petitioner] was there, some of the times he was not. Most of the time
there was people there, homeless people that he hired were there." R. 191 at 113:15-17.
When asked if he ever asked petitioner to "hire anybody else," Mr. Warburton responded,
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"No, I did not." R. 191 at 113:18-19. And when asked if he ever fired one of them, he
answered, "I never fired anybody." R. 191 at 114:9. He similarly denied hiring "a couple
of guys that were hanging out around the apartments to help Rick? A guy named Marco
and a guy named Pedro?" R. 191 at 132:19-21. He responded,
A
I hired nobody. I mean, there was homeless people there. There was
guys that Rick said, "Oh these homeless people didn't show up so [I] hired
these two guys instead." Those guys came up there and while Rick was
working there and asked Rick, "Hey, do you need any help? I'm a handy
guy." "Well, yeah, and the homeless people didn't show up today, you
guys can take their spots." That's how the whole thing went out, just like
that
Q
How do you know?
A
How do I know? He told me. "My guys didn't show up today, but
these guys came by asking me if I wanted some help and I hired them." I
says, whatever. And I remember Rick telling me those guys worked all day
and I paid them but they didn't do anything. And I remember saying why
did you pay them then?
R. 191 at 132:22 - 133:11. When asked if he "t[old] Mr. Norris to go hire homeless
people from the shelter and keep them busy[,]" R. 191 at 134:6-7, Mr. Warburton replied,
"No. The homeless shelter was his own idea. He painted his own house and he hired
homeless people for that too. That's what he does. That was his own thing. Whatever he
did with the homeless shelter or wherever he found these people was not from me."
R. 191 at 134:8-12.
Nor did Mr. Warburton ask petitioner to hire painters; instead, Mr. Warburton
hired them separately, and they did not work under petitioner's supervision. As Mr.
Warburton explained,
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[w]ell, we got to the point where I think the project was three weeks
into it and there was so far from being done. Rick was saying, Fm way over
budget, I'm way over budget, Fm way over budget. I had a friend that had a
cousin that does painting. It was around Christmas time, the guyfs from, I
don't know, he's not from here. He said he would do the painting for us, all
four units for I think $1,200. So we told the guys to paint them for us since
it was so far into the project we were behind schedule.
R. 191 at 115:3-11. As to supervision, Mr. Warburton testified, "I don't think that
anybody supervised." R. 191 at 115:23-24. He explained that "they came three nights,
they worked from 5:00 until midnight I think it was unsupervised and they did their own
thing and when I got there, they were done in three days." R. 19Lat 131:2-4. Unlike the
labor that petitioner hired to complete his own responsibilities, the painters were outside
the remaining scope of the project he was engaged to complete.
Petitioner's autonomy over his own work is amply demonstrated by the record
evidence. He was engaged to accomplish a general goal: to restore certain apartments to
rentability. He determined that he could accomplish this goal within a fixed budget in a
three-to-four-day time frame, and was left alone to do so until the four days had lapsed.
Even after that time, any supervision by respondent was minimal: weekly, at the most.
He made suggestions for additional work to which Mr. Warburton consented. He hired
his own labor to assist him in completing the project. Only when he failed to complete
the project within the agreed budget and in a timely manner did respondent terminate the
working relationship and order him off the job site. The record provides substantial
evidence for the findings supporting the Commission's conclusion that respondent did not
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exert sufficient control over petitioner's activities to overcome his status as an
independent contractor

Both the ALJ and the Commission observed that petitioner used his o w n tools and
si ipplies in his work on the project. T h e A L J stated, "Petitioner used his ow n truck and
tools to repair 1:1 le i et ital i it iits[. ]M R 128, at id 1:1 le Coi nmission notcu .n«i.

•

\.»ms

began working on the apartments using 1 lis ow n ti i K k ai id to DIS. , ii ic Ii iding his air
compressor for sandblasting." R 186. While acknowledging this-finding, petitioner
further staler ..,a; K^pouJ^n;. puiciuL->cw pains . iui vJeanin^ ^ p p l n - s for Petitioner to use
andalsi

'

« L...II-.*,:

provision of incidental supplies and the use of a trailer are not incompatible with the fact
that petitioner "had his own tools and he had a job to be done." R ^ 01 at 1 -10 ? Tn fact,
I1 In ' \ 'in! IUI i n n f o o l p n i r h i iiial< i M I K ill-ii i K M i n i m i \ iiiol

n u i i M ibe s e c u r e :

*ka\ \ . *u said Mark told you to store your tools in the garageWas that a condition of the work or w a s it because he just didn't want your
tools to be stolen
Veil. [ >l .in was because of the problems, the vandalism and stuff
?•
a ah.u ' ; i :.!ii >olo would c o m e back and ievandali/e diose
apartments again.
Q
But you testified Mark was y oi ir ft iei id?
A
Yes.
Q
I assumed he didn't want your tools to get stolen?
A
R ight
I

I I HI "' ' '",l In

\ lii aipphes, [itlilioiiei s ow n hearing exhibits evidence that he

purchased most of the supplies foi i ise ot 11:1: le pi oject

19

S'< u " R 76 80 (listing < :ost of

"materials and supplies" for the project); 82 (listing "personal items used for job");
83-115 ("time sheets" that include receipts for purchases). The fact that he furnished the
supplies is further evidenced by his subsequent filing of a mechanic's lien, in part, for
materials. R. 122.
F.

Miscellaneous Factors
The mechanic's lien petitioner filed against the rental property on January 12,

2006, is additional evidence that even petitioner considered himself an independent
contractor, not an employee. In the notice of lien, petitioner states, under oath that he
supplied "LABOR FOR REPAIRS, IMPROVEMENTS AND MATERIALS on [and
after] NOVEMBER 22, 2005." R. 122. This claim is inconsistent with employee status.
While neither the ALJ nor the Commission based its decision on this fact, it provides
additional support for the conclusion that petitioner acted as an independent contractor
and is an additional basis on which the Court can affirm the Commission's decision:
[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed
from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though
such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not
raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower
court. "
Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ] 18, 29 P.3d 1225.
Petitioner's reference to an alleged determination by the United States Internal
Revenue Service that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, carries little
weight. The record contains no testimony or other evidence showing how the IRS
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determination was reached, and there is no indication that the process involved
information provided by both petitioner and Mr \ dams. Nor is there any discussion of
• I.K'lm , thai 11 if IkStkvim J n i \ Jill lr .1 , .1- r.i<ih< . Ii< <
" llio'i " lailois iinght iclate
to the factors relevant under Utah law. Moreover, the alleged "determination" does not
appear in the record Finally, although petitioner claims that the IRS required respondent
to issue a vV 2 tax form instead of a Form 1Q99, there is i 10 VV 2 of i ecord, and the F'orm

petitioner's scant reference to the IRS determination is equivocal at best.
In light of these miscellaneous factors, as well as petitioner's use of his own tools
and sttpplirv, 1111". tiL'lil In i 'uiii'ini! Ilic malum ill

IIIIIK In tin

woik was perlnrmed, llie

absence of substantial oversight by respondent, the lump sum budget for the project, and
the fact that the woik v- .^ no! <: pail or process in respondent Adams 1 trade or business,
the Comi i lissioi i"s si ibstai itiall) suppoi ted : - 'ings susta,,. \\ .;oncu.Mon ma! petitioner
was an independent contractor. F or ibesr *-r »-..-,
entitled to workers1 compensation benefits for In injuries is within the limits of
reasonableness and rationality, warranting Unh \ - *uii*>. aiiumance.
ANY W O R k i N u K L I , vTIONSHIP BETWEEN" l>iiIi 110NER
AND RESPONDENT ADAMS WAS SEVERED BEFORE PETITIONER
SIJSTAINED HIS INJURY
Even if petitioner were found to be respondent Adams' employee, any working

sustained his alleged MI -><y. iv. I J I , i 6 / u.^. while conceding tl lat he and respondei it

Adams "had a falling out" on December 23, 2005, petitioner asserts that he continued to
work on the day of his injury, December 26, the same date on which he returned to the
work site to pick up his air compressor. Aplt. Brief at 22. He argues that the action of
retrieving his air compressor constituted a retrieval of his personal effects that should
extend the employer's liability for workers1 compensation benefits past the exact time of
termination, although he admits that there is no Utah case law on point. He urges the
Court to implement a policy extending compensation to post-termination activities
necessary to the orderly termination of the employment relationship. However, petitioner
cannot prevail for three reasons. First, the Commission's decision falls within the limits
of reasonableness and rationality, and the underlying findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence. Second, petitioner did not raise this issue until his petition for
review of the ALJ's decision by the Commission. His "failure to raise the claim at the
original hearing precludes any review on appeal." Zupon v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 860
P.2d 960, 963 n.2 (Utah App. 1993). Third, each of the cases petitioner cites in support
of this proposition is readily distinguishable.
In Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d 547 ( 1953), an
employee was killed when the roof of a loading platform collapsed and the material it
supported fell on the employee and crushed him while he was eating his lunch in the
shade it provided. The platform had undergone a temporary repair about 50 minutes
before the lunch period, "at which time the employees were told not to return in the
afternoon for work but to return the following morning, giving time to repair the
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platform..'1 259 P.2d at 548. Even though the work for the day "had unexpectedly come
to an end at the nooi. b-nnr," id, the court concluded that the death was compensable.

"Unquestionably in the instant case compensation would hav e been payable had it been
contemplated that the employee would resume his employment after the lunch period,
1!, ;,|

i "i. ' hat differ ei ice si 101 ild it i nake that there was to be a cessation of work wni M*.

following morning?" Id. at 550. I h llike tl ic ei t iployee's job ii i Nicln ilson, petitionei fs
working relationship with respondent Adams had been severed days before he was
injured.
S. " it

- • 7: • • - V i / i

h • m ? s. 8 8 9 I", 2< il II2 79 (01 h

9 1 ) h ; s ;ii nil; u I >

Nicholson in mis relevant aspect. The employee worked at tiie hospital as a licensed
practical nurse and had not been separated from employment at the time she was injured.

the workplace to pick up h«M pavcheck and accomplish other errands." 889 P.2d at 1279.
The court found the injur) compensable * -, - ng that ff[a]fter surveying the resolution of
tl lis issi le, it becoi lies clear tl le autl: 101 it) n t tl le ai ea is di/v ersc, if i i.ot splintered[,]" id at
1281, the court limited its decision affording coverage for tl i :: ii i \\ nit \ to tl ie facts of tl ic
case... The court further observed, that the rule articulated in Larson's Workmen's
Compensation I ,iw, J>WK mp an employee "in the course of en iployment while collecting

by the statement that the contract of employment is not fully terminated until the
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employee is paid." Id. Given that respondent Adams had paid petitioner all the money he
believed petitioner was due on December 6, 2005, the rationale underlying the rule cited
in St. Anthony Hospital is not applicable here.
Although petitioner contends that his case is remarkably similar to Herman v.
Sherwood Industries, Inc., 244 Conn. 502, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998), the facts show the
contrary. The claimant in that case was terminated from employment and, on the same
day,
attended a termination meeting at Sherwood's personnel office. At that
meeting, Sherwoodfs personnel officer conducted an exit interview and gave
the claimant a layoff slip and a copy of an exit interview check list. Also at
the termination meeting, the personnel officer informed the claimant that he
could retrieve his personal tool box from the Sherwood loading dock, where
it had been placed by Sherwood's foreman. Thereafter, in order to retrieve
his tool box, the claimant was escorted from the personnel office to the
loading dock,
where he was injured. 710 A.2d at 1339. Although the court ruled that "a claimant is
entitled to workers1 compensation for an injury that was incurred while leaving the job
site immediately after the termination of his or her employment[,]" id. at 1341, it staled
that "[t]he facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of
whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to
the job site." Id. at 1341 n.8.
Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975), is likewise distinguishable. In Nails, a mechanic who was terminated from
employment was injured when he "returned to the job two days after being discharged to
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pick up his tools, which he was required to furnish as a condition of his employment."
347 A.2d. at 567. The court permitted compensability on the ground that "it was
• ::i istoi i lai ) to allow ei i iplo> ees tw o oi tl iree day s to remove tl leii tools." 1 < i I lowever, the
court noted that "If! here is responsible millioul 1 lo llir . i>nluiv| ,|" .i ',k now !<„% ignijj,, dial
"whether an accident causiim an injury to ;tn employee results from some obligation,
condn--»-i ? MUiien. .*! the employment depends on the circumstances of each particular
case " l / I c titioi v :a 1 la s pointed t : it IC en ist :)i :t I • : i pi actic e b) r espoi ident A dan is of
permitting a delayed retrieval of tools from the job site when a project is completed.
Finally, petitioner asserts that there was evidence showing that he was still
;

-
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the injury, and contends that there is no independent d o c u m e n t ? •
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contrary. While accusing respondent o f "inherently self s e n mg" a id ' S u s p v f
(" Minion ; ilul llie working relationship was severed m, December 2 3 , 2005, Aplt. Brief at
22, petitioner fails to iveoj'.m/e lhal III*' e v i d n n v he nfos In show s n vices lendeivd on
December 26, his own testimony and the work summaries he generated, are equally selfserving and suspect. It was the Commission's role to choose between equally
• ausiblr m i iphiiiihlt* \ic\\

ul iho e\ Mono

MIIUIU

lh;i Iliri l mill n i l l

n imilmn

"even though w e may have come to a different conclusion had the case c o m e before us
for de novo review." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
>i d, as a \ v 1 10k , coi itaii is substai itial evidence supporting the findings
underlyine the Commission's cone h lsioi i tl iiat am: o working relatioi iship betw eei I petitioi ler
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and respondent Adams had ended before the date of petitionees alleged injury, December
26, 2005. The Commission's choice to believe respondent Adams1 testimony over
petitioner's was a legitimate view of the evidence. Given the record support for the
Commission's ruling on this point, there are no grounds for reversal of its determination
that petitioner would not have been entitled to workers' compensation benefits even if he
had been respondent Adams' employee.
III. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT DOES NOT ENTITLE PETITIONER TO
BENEFITS WHERE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S
CONCLUSION
Petitioner briefly argues that he is entitled to compensation because "disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised
from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim." Aplt. Brief at 25. In support,
he provides, without analysis, a string of citations to cases decided from 1919 to 1990.
He ignores this Court's decision in Strate v. Labor Commission, 2006 UT App 179, 136
P.3d 1273, rejecting the application of liberal construction where the record supports the
Commission's conclusion. Id. at \ 26. To accept petitioner's argument would be to
deprive the Commission of its broad grant of discretion in matters involving workers'
compensation, subject only to scrutiny for reasonableness and rationality. Gates, 2002
UT App 428 at *1. Liberal construction cannot save petitioner's case in light of the
substantial evidence for the findings that support the Commission's decision.
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CONCLUSION
I he Commission drew two conclusions from, its findings of fact: that petitioner

relationship between the two had terminated before the date of petitioner's iiijm v.
Petitioner's failure to marshal the substantial evidence supporting the underlying findings
r-.:n. a .suinctcnt D a ^ io uiinn; VUL t ,;IM..,ISSK)|I - coi iclusioi is. But even it the
Court chooses to read i. the i i lei its of petitioi lei "s ::laii t is, tl le • z < - idence of recoi d shov s tl lat
the Commission's decision Jail v iiliir. tiic limiL of reasonableness and rationality. For
this reason, it warrants the Coi ill's affirmance.
S l A l h M h M KiAjAKUJMii U K A i . A K K I U M I U N T

Respondent Uninsured Lmplmeib fund believes the iav vo\ turning the issues in
this case is well settled and that oral aruuinenf is not necessary to a proper decision.
•- -

DAl"liUthis?U

• n r m i m r n t is O R l c i c j :,\ tiic

: ulMaicI

lf

^uil.

Mr

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee/Respondem
Uninsured Employers Fund

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 7<3
day of March, 2010,1 caused to be delivered
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND to the following:
By U.S. Mail:
Melvin A. Cook
Martin, Nelson, Cook & Taylor
139 East South Temple #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Harold Van Adams
5293 East Elkhorn Circle
Eden, Utah 84310
By State Mail:
Edward O. Ogilvie
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
P. O. Box 146641
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611

